Abstract:

For a long time， hostile close-in reconnaissance （HCR） against China by foreign countries has become increasingly fierce， and has been upgraded to the theoretical level of "deterrence by detection"， showing a systematic and intelligent development trend. The threat， efficiency mechanism， technical theory， cognitive limitations of HCR are analyzed， limitations and cognitive misunderstandings of traditional DHCR （denial of hostile approaching reconnaissance） operations are analyzed. Taking electronic reconnaissance and radar counter-reconnaissance in electronic warfare as examples， regaining the electromagnetic right in DHCR is focused both with denying the tasks of HCR operations， a new theory of active defense in electromagnetic domain is proposed， and combined with the DHCR， a new tactical operation type is proposed with name of CRJ， laying a theoretical foundation for the systematization of DHCR.

Key words: hostile close-in reconnaissance（HCR）, deny hostile close-in reconnaissance, deterrence by detection, electromagnetic domain, electromagnetic warfare, active defense

摘要：

长期以来域外国家对中俄实施各种敌对抵近侦察（HCR），这种现象愈演愈烈，并已经提升到“侦察威慑”的理论层次，且呈现体系化、智能化的发展趋势。分析了HCR的威胁、效能机理、技术原理、认知局限性，以及DHCR（拒止敌对进近侦察）传统措施的局限性和认知误区。以电子侦察在电子战中的应用和HCR/DHCR中的雷达反侦察为例，从夺回DHCR中的制电磁权及遏制HCR任务的角度出发，针对性地提出了电磁域主动防御的新理论。结合DHCR任务，针对性地提出了CRJ（反侦察干扰）的新战术任务类型，为DHCR体系化奠定理论基础。

关键词: 敌对抵近侦察, 拒止敌对抵近侦察, 侦察威慑, 电磁域, 电磁战, 主动防御